Financial markets process orders faster now than ever before. However, they remain prone to occasional dysfunction where prices move away from fundamentals. One important type of market fragility is flash events. Identifying such events is crucial to understanding them and their effects. This post displays the results from a new methodology to identify these, but also longer lasting V-shaped events, as we show here with an application to three sovereign bond markets.
Robert Czech, Shiyang Huang, Dong Lou and Tianyu Wang
Government bond yields serve as a benchmark for virtually all other rates in financial markets. But what factors drive these yields? One view is that yields only move notably when important news hit the market, for example monetary policy announcements. Others suspect that some investors have an information advantage due to their access to costly information (e.g. data providers) or more accurate interpretations of public information. In a recent paper, we show that two investor groups – hedge funds and mutual funds – have an information edge in the UK government bond (gilt) market, and that these two investor types operate through different trading strategies and over different horizons.
The US dollar has a dominant role in the international financial system. The fact that trade and cross-border investment are overwhelmingly dollar-denominated means that non-US banks are heavily reliant on dollar funding (Aldasoro and Ehlers (2018)). This funding dried up during the Covid-19 epidemic, prompting the use of central bank swap lines as a policy response. This post looks at recent research on why dollar funding dried up in March, the efficacy of swap lines and the implications for cross-border banking, exchange rates and the international financial system.
Every minute of the day, Google returns over 3.5 million searches, Instagram users post nearly 50,000 photos, and Tinder matches about 7,000 times. We all produce and consume data, and financial firms are key contributors to this trend. Indeed, the global business models of many firms have amplified the data-intensity of the financial services industry. But potential fragmentation of the global data supply chain now poses a novel risk to financial services. In this blog post, we first discuss the importance of data flows for financial services, and then potential risks from blockages to these flows.
GDP-linked bonds are sovereign debt instruments with repayments linked to the evolution of a country’s GDP. Originally proposed by Shiller in the 90s, they have recently been re-invoked in the debate around the policy response to the Covid-19 pandemic. These instruments present an obvious attraction for issuers: repayments are lower at times when the economy is growing relatively slowly, which typically coincides with lower tax earnings. A greater share of the risk of weak growth is then transferred to investors, who will require a compensation given they are typically risk-averse. Therefore, while the design is attractive ex-ante, a relevant question facing sovereigns willing to issue this type of instrument is `at what cost?’. In this post (and in an underlying Staff Working Paper) we provide some tentative answers.
Speculative buying can drive cryptocurrency prices down. This is contrary to the usual laws of economics. Blockchain technology limits how quickly transactions can be settled. This constraint creates competition for priority between different users. The more speculative activity there is, the longer it takes to make a payment. But the future value of cryptocurrency depends on its usefulness as a means of payment. Speculation therefore affects price formation through a channel that does not exist for other asset classes. This can explain the high price volatility of cryptocurrencies, and is consistent with the low adoption rate so far.
Meteorologists and insurers talk about the “1-in-100 year storm”. Should regulators do the same for financial crises? In this post, we argue that false confidence in people’s ability to calculate probabilities of rare events might end up worsening the crises regulators are trying to prevent.
The financial crisis exposed banks’ vulnerability to a type of risk associated with derivatives: credit valuation adjustment (CVA) risk. Despite being a major driver of losses – around $43 billion across 10 banks according to one estimate – there had been no capital requirement to cushion banks against these losses. New rules in 2014 changed this.
Central banks accept a wide range of assets from participants as collateral in their liquidity operations – but can this lead to undesired side effects? Such an approach can enhance overall liquidity in the financial sector, by allowing participants to transform illiquid collateral into more liquid assets. But, as a result, the central bank then needs to manage the greater potential risks of holding these riskier assets on its own balance sheet. Financially weaker participants may be encouraged to hold these assets if they can benefit from the higher returns, which compensate for the greater risk. In our recent paper we investigate whether central banks’ acceptance of a broad set of collateral incentivises the concentration of risk by examining the experience of the Bank of England (BoE).