Quantifying the macroeconomic impact of geopolitical risk

Julian Reynolds

Policymakers and market participants consistently cite geopolitical developments as a key risk to the global economy and financial system. But how can one quantify the potential macroeconomic effects of these developments? Applying local projections to a popular metric of geopolitical risk, I show that geopolitical risk weighs on GDP in the central case and increases the severity of adverse outcomes. This impact appears much larger in emerging market economies (EMEs) than advanced economies (AEs). Geopolitical risk also pushes up inflation in both central case and adverse outcomes, implying that macroeconomic policymakers have to trade-off stabilising output versus inflation. Finally, I show that geopolitical risk may transmit to output and inflation via trade and uncertainty channels.

Continue reading →

Three facts about the rising number of UK business exits

Jelle Barkema, Maren Froemel and Sophie Piton

Record-high firm exits make headlines, but who are the firms going out of business? This post documents three facts about the rising number of corporations dissolving using granular data from Companies House and the Insolvency Service. We show that the increase in dissolutions that have already materialised reflected a catch-up following Covid and was concentrated among firms started during Covid. While these firms were small and had a limited macroeconomic impact, firms currently in the process of dissolving are larger. Their exit might therefore be more material from a macroeconomic perspective. We also discuss how the recent economic environment could contribute to further rises in dissolutions and particularly insolvencies in the future that could have more material macroeconomic impact.

Continue reading →

To the lower bound and back: measuring UK monetary conditions

Natalie Burr, Julian Reynolds and Mike Joyce

Monetary policymakers have a number of tools they can use to influence monetary conditions, in order to maintain price stability. While central banks typically favour short-term policy rates as their primary instrument, when policy rates remained constrained at near-zero levels following the global financial crisis (GFC), many central banks – including the Bank of England – turned to unconventional policies to further ease monetary conditions. How can the combined effect of these policies be measured? This post presents one possible metric – a Monetary Conditions Index – that uses a data-driven approach to summarise information from a range of variables related to the conduct of UK monetary policy. We discuss what this implies about how UK monetary conditions have evolved since the GFC.

Continue reading →

The transmission channels of geopolitical risk

Samuel Smith and Marco Pinchetti

Recent events in the Middle East, as well as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, have sparked renewed interest in the consequences of geopolitical tensions for global economic developments. In this post, we argue that geopolitical risk (GPR) can transmit via two separate and intrinsically different channels: (i) a deflationary macro channel, and (ii) an inflationary energy channel. We then use a Bayesian vector autoregression (BVAR) framework to evaluate these channels empirically. Our estimates suggest that GPR shocks can place downward or upward pressure on advanced economy price levels depending on which of the two channels the shock propagates through.

Continue reading →

Flow of funds and the UK real economy

Laura Achiro, Gerry Gunner and Neha Bora

A flow of funds framework is a way of understanding and tracking the movement of financial assets between different sectors of the economy. This blog specifically analyses UK corporate and household sectoral flows from 2000 to the present and highlights how this framework can reveal useful trends and signals for policymakers about the real economy. For instance, the accumulation of debt in the pre-global financial crisis (GFC) era by households and corporates was a warning signal that indicated several potential risks and vulnerabilities in the economy, including overleveraging and asset price inflation.

Continue reading →

Markup matters: monetary policy works through aspirations

Tim Willems and Rick van der Ploeg

Since the post-Covid rise in inflation has been accompanied by strong wage growth, interactions between wage and price-setters, each wishing to attain a certain markup, have regained prominence. In our recently published Staff Working Paper, we ask how monetary policy should be conducted amid, what has been referred to as, a ‘battle of the markups’. We find that countercyclicality in aspired price markups (‘sellers’ inflation’) calls for more dovish monetary policy. Empirically, we however find markups to be procyclical for most countries, in which case tighter monetary policy is the appropriate response to above-target inflation.

Continue reading →

Another reason to care about investment taxes

Alex Kontoghiorghes

Do lower taxes lead to higher stock prices? Do companies consider tax rates when deciding on their dividend pay-outs and whether to issue new capital? If you’re thinking ‘yes’, you might be surprised to know that there was little real-world evidence (let alone UK-based evidence) which finds a strong link between personal investment tax rates on the one hand, and stock prices and the financial decisions of companies on the other. In this post, I summarise the findings from a recent study which shows that capital gains and dividend taxes do indeed have big effects on risk-adjusted equity returns, as well as the dividend, capital structure, and real investment decisions of companies.

Continue reading →

New money, old money

David Rule and Iain de Weymarn

Technologies such as distributed ledgers create the possibility of new forms of digital money, whether privately-issued ‘stable coins’, tokenised commercial bank deposits, or central bank digital currencies. Authorities are considering a world where digital money circulates alongside existing forms of money. In the past, the nature of money has often changed. Prior to the late-seventeenth century, English money comprised predominantly silver coin and in the subsequent two centuries mainly gold coin, before evolving to include paper banknotes and bank accounts linked to card, internet and app-based payment systems. But what can a previous period when money changed – 1695–97, when paper money first began to circulate alongside coin – tell us about the possible transition to digital money?

Continue reading →

How resilient are UK corporate bond issuers to refinancing risks?

Laura Achiro and Neha Bora

Central banks in most advanced economies have tightened monetary policy by raising interest rates. Tighter financing conditions may make it harder for some businesses to refinance their debt or could mean they face less favourable terms when they do. This blog explores the extent to which bond maturities could crystallise these refinancing risks. Overall, UK corporate bond issuers appear broadly resilient to higher financing costs, but risks are higher for riskier borrowers particularly if the macroeconomic outlook and funding conditions were to deteriorate.

Continue reading →

Cash stuffing versus girl maths: how do people budget in a digital world?

Zahra Damji and Eleanor Hammerton

The best purchases in life are free. How’s that possible, you ask? Well, pay with cash of course! The idea that anything bought with cash is free because the money is spent when you make the withdrawal, not when you make the purchase, is one example of the TikTok phenomenon #girlmath. This belief, which is not gender or age specific, contradicts headlines that suggest people are switching to cash to help them with budgeting. We draw on an online survey of UK adults conducted by the Bank of England in 2023 to explore how people budget in an increasingly digital world. We find that, rather than turning to cash, contactless is king when it comes to budgeting.

Continue reading →