Montagu Norman was the Bank of England’s longest serving Governor (1920-44) and one of the leading players on the interwar international financial stage. He was a controversial and enigmatic character who pioneered co-operation between central banks.
Gino Cenedese, Pasquale Della Corte and Tianyu Wang
Deviations from covered interest parity (CIP) represent an arbitrage opportunity, at least in theory. In a new paper, we show that post-crisis financial regulation may explain why this mispricing persists and cannot be arbitraged away. Our exercise uses a unique dataset on contract-level foreign exchange derivatives coupled with an exogenous variation associated with the public disclosure of the leverage ratio. We find that dealers with a higher leverage ratio demand an extra premium from their clients for synthetic dollar funding (e.g., borrowing in euros and swapping into dollars) relative to direct dollar funding (i.e., borrowing dollars in the money market), resulting in CIP deviations.
Cryptoassets (or ‘cryptocurrencies’) are notoriously volatile. For example, in November 2018, Bitcoin – one of the more stable cryptoassets – lost 43% of its value in just 11 days. This kind of volatility makes it difficult for cryptoassets to function as money: they’re too unstable to be a good store of value, means of exchange or unit of account. But could so-called ‘stablecoins’ solve this problem and finally provide a price-stable cryptoasset?
relationship between financial conditions and risks to growth in an economy?
And, in a world of highly integrated financial markets, to what extent are
these “local” risks rather than reflections of global developments? In this
post we offer some tentative answers. Financial conditions, measured across a
broad range of asset classes and countries, display an important common
component reflecting global developments. Loose financial conditions today
increase the likelihood of a growth boom over the following few quarters, but
when global financial conditions are loose, they increase the chances of a
sharp contraction further ahead, highlighting some of the challenges of
managing risks to growth across time from a policy maker’s perspective.
Defaults on sovereign debt – the term commonly used to denote debt issued by national governments and other fiscally autonomous territories – are a recurring feature of public finance. They are more widespread than is often appreciated, since 1960 involving 145 governments, over half the current sovereign universe. Examples include the many governments ensnared in the Latin American and Eastern European debt crises of the 1980s. More recently, there have been big bond defaults by Russia (1998), Argentina (2001), Greece (2012), and Puerto Rico (2015). On a smaller scale, scores of sovereign defaults can occur each year on one or more types of debt. Some, such as Sudan’s, have dragged on for decades and remain unresolved (Chart 1).
Carsten Jung, Theresa Löber, Anina Thiel and Thomas Viegas
Governments have pledged to meet the Paris Target of restricting global temperature rises to ‘well below’ 2˚C. But reducing CO2 emissions and other greenhouse gases means reallocating resources away from high-carbon towards low-carbon activities. That reallocation could be considerable: fossil fuels account for more than 10% of world trade and around 10% of global investment. In this post, we consider the macroeconomic effects of the transition to a low-carbon economy and how it might vary across countries. While much of the discussion has focussed on the hit to economic activity and the potential for job losses in higher-carbon sectors, we highlight that the transition also offers opportunities. And the overall impact depends crucially on when and how the transition takes place.
For the global economy, it was the best of times, and then it was the worst of times. Buoyed by very strong growth in emerging markets, the global economy boomed in the mid-2000s. On average, annualised world GDP growth exceeded 5% for the four years leading up to 2007 – a pace of growth that hadn’t been sustained since the early 1970s. But it wasn’t to last. In this post, I illustrate how the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 coincided with the deepest, most synchronised global downturn since World War II. And I describe how after having seen the fallout of the Lehman collapse, macroeconomic forecasters were nevertheless surprised by the magnitude of the ensuing global recession.
Asset markets in advanced economies have become integrated to a degree never seen before in the history of modern finance. This is especially true for global equities starting in the 1990s. We find that this increase in synchronization is primarily driven by fluctuations in risk-appetite rather than in risk-free rates, or in dividends. Moreover, we find that U.S. monetary policy plays a major role in explaining such fluctuations. This transmission channel affects economies with both fixed and floating exchange rates, although the effects are more muted in floating rate regimes.
Estimates of GDP growth are published with a considerable lag – even in some major economies we still only have partial data on what GDP growth was in Q1 2018. So ‘nowcasting’ GDP using more timely indicators of economic activity is an important way of assessing the strength of the world economy in real time. Good indicators are timely, correlated with measures of world activity and should outperform simple benchmarks. Unlike other global indicators such as business surveys or trade data, metals prices are available minute by minute. They also tend to move closely with world GDP. This post assesses how well they perform at nowcasting world GDP.
Tommaso Aquilante, Enrico Longoni, Patrick Schneider
Countries’ goods exports are normally defined in terms of what has been shipped when and where. Recent literature (e.g. Besedeš and Prusa, 2011 and Besedeš et al, 2016) shows that looking at how long trade relationships have been in place is important as well. Using highly granular data, we show that over 60% of the value of UK nominal goods exports is in very mature trading relationships, by which we mean exports of a particular product between a pair of countries in a given year. This is true even with substantial churn (new relationships starting and old ones ceasing) going on all the while, and for exports in real terms as well.