International spillovers from climate policy

Francesca Diluiso and Aydan Dogan

To achieve the emissions reduction targets outlined in The Paris Agreement, many economies have started implementing various types of climate policies. These policies, which include subsidies for green production or investment, carbon taxes, and cap and trade schemes, are crucial for guiding the transition to a greener economy. However, by altering the cost and the emission intensity of domestically produced goods, they may have an impact on inflation, output, and international trade flows. This blog post explores the spillover effects due to the implementation of climate policy in a single country. We examine two major types of policies currently implemented and discussed worldwide: green subsidies and carbon taxes.

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Global value chains and inflation: how imported inputs shape UK prices

Aydan Dogan, Melih Firat and Aditya Soenarjo

How does the use of imported inputs in production affect inflation dynamics in the UK? Over the past few decades, with the rise of global value chains (GVCs), production processes have become increasingly interlinked across countries and sectors. This interconnection means that firms’ pricing decisions are now more influenced by foreign factors. The importance of globalisation in shaping inflation dynamics was highlighted during the supply-chain disruptions caused by the Covid-19 crisis. In a recent paper, we explore the impact of the rising share of imported intermediate goods on the UK Phillips curve. We show that UK industries with higher shares of intermediate imports from emerging market economies (EMEs) have flatter Phillips curves.

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Why short-term finance matters (a lot more) to exporting firms

Aydan Dogan and Ida Hjortsoe

Exporting allows firms to access a larger market, but it also implies costs and risks. Some of these costs and risks are due to the time between production and sales generally being longer for exported goods than for goods sold in the domestic market. In our recent Staff Working Paper, we find that among UK manufacturing firms, exporters tend to have more liabilities than non-exporters, and we show that the link between short-term liabilities and labour costs is significantly tighter for exporters. This novel evidence supports the view that exporters’ short-term liabilities help cover costs and risks over the longer time period between production and sales. Consequently, financial conditions are likely to affect exporters more than non-exporters.

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Selling England (no longer) by the pound: currency-mismatches and the dollarisation of UK exports

Marco Garofalo, Giovanni Rosso and Roger Vicquery

Most international trade is denominated in dominant currencies such as the US dollar. What explains the adoption of dominant currency pricing and what are its macroeconomic implications? In a recent paper, we explore a rare instance of transition in aggregate export invoicing patterns. In the aftermath of the depreciation that followed the Brexit referendum in 2016, UK exporters progressively shifted to invoicing most of their exports in dollars, rather than in pounds. This was driven by firms more exposed to currency mismatches, eg exporting in pounds but importing in dollars before the depreciation. As a result of this aggregate transition to dollar pricing, a dollar appreciation now depresses demand for UK exports by twice as much than before 2016.

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Quantifying the macroeconomic impact of geopolitical risk

Julian Reynolds

Policymakers and market participants consistently cite geopolitical developments as a key risk to the global economy and financial system. But how can one quantify the potential macroeconomic effects of these developments? Applying local projections to a popular metric of geopolitical risk, I show that geopolitical risk weighs on GDP in the central case and increases the severity of adverse outcomes. This impact appears much larger in emerging market economies (EMEs) than advanced economies (AEs). Geopolitical risk also pushes up inflation in both central case and adverse outcomes, implying that macroeconomic policymakers have to trade-off stabilising output versus inflation. Finally, I show that geopolitical risk may transmit to output and inflation via trade and uncertainty channels.

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The transmission channels of geopolitical risk

Samuel Smith and Marco Pinchetti

Recent events in the Middle East, as well as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, have sparked renewed interest in the consequences of geopolitical tensions for global economic developments. In this post, we argue that geopolitical risk (GPR) can transmit via two separate and intrinsically different channels: (i) a deflationary macro channel, and (ii) an inflationary energy channel. We then use a Bayesian vector autoregression (BVAR) framework to evaluate these channels empirically. Our estimates suggest that GPR shocks can place downward or upward pressure on advanced economy price levels depending on which of the two channels the shock propagates through.

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Global R*

Ambrogio Cesa-Bianchi, Richard Harrison and Rana Sajedi

Recent increases in interest rates around the world, following a multi-decade decline, have intensified the debate on their long-run prospects. Are previous trends reversing or will rates revert to low values as current shocks subside? Answering this question requires assessing the underlying forces driving secular interest-rate trends. In a recent paper, we study the long-run drivers of the global trend interest rate – ‘Global R*’ – in the 70 years up to the pandemic. Global R* fell by more than three percentage points from its peak in the mid-1970s, driven by falling productivity growth and increased longevity. Our results suggest that without a reversal in these trends, or new forces emerging to offset them, long-run Global R* is likely to remain low.

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Supply chain disruptions: shocks, links, and hidden exposure

Rebecca Freeman, Richard Baldwin and Angelos Theodorakopoulos

Supply chain disruptions are routinely blamed for things ranging from elevated inflation to shortages of medical equipment in the pandemic. But how should exposure to foreign supply chains be measured? Using a global input-output database, this post shows that the full exposure of US manufacturing to foreign suppliers (especially China) is much larger than face value measures indicate. Moreover, it argues that the big change in supply chain disruptions in recent years stems from changes in the nature of the shocks (from idiosyncratic to systemic), not the nature of the supply chains.

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The granular origins of exchange-rate fluctuations

Simon Lloyd, Daniel Ostry and Balduin Bippus

How much capital flows move exchange rates is a central question in international macroeconomics. A major challenge to addressing it has been the difficulty identifying exogenous cross-border flows, since flows and exchange rates can evolve simultaneously with factors like risk sentiment. In this post, we summarise a staff working paper that resolves this impasse using bank-level data capturing the external positions of UK-based global intermediaries to construct novel ‘Granular Instrumental Variables‘ (GIVs). Using these GIVs, we find that banks’ United States dollar (USD) demand is inelastic – a 1% increase in net-dollar assets appreciates the dollar by 2% against sterling – state dependent – effects double when banks’ capital ratios are one standard deviation below average – and that banks are a ‘marginal investor’ in the dollar-sterling market.

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Has the import price shock been worse in the UK or euro area?

Josh Martin and Julian Reynolds

How much have higher import prices increased consumer prices in the UK and euro area? This post explores this question using a framework grounded in some fundamental economic and national accounting concepts. Starting with the GDP price, we adjust for relative import and export prices to arrive at a consumer prices measure – this gives us a sense of the impact of import prices and the terms of trade shock on consumer price inflation. For the euro area, aggregating imports across member countries, which includes trade between members, risks overstating total imports and thus the effect on inflation. Using supplementary data to resolve this issue, we find that the euro area terms of trade shock has been larger than the UK’s.

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