Input/output networks are important in propagating shocks in an economy. For understanding the aggregate effects of shocks, it is useful to know which sectors are central (ie, providing a lot of inputs to a lot of other sectors) and how the central sectors are affected by and propagate the shocks to other sectors. In a new Staff Working Paper, my co-author and I build a structural model incorporating key features of the sectoral production input/output network in the UK, and then use the model to help us understand UK productivity dynamics since the global financial crisis (GFC). We find that the slower productivity growth rates since the GFC are mainly due to negative shocks originating from the manufacturing sector.
Ralph de Haas, Vincent Sterk and Neeltje van Horen
Anaemic productivity growth and limited business dynamism remain key policy concerns in Europe and the US. Policies to improve macroeconomic performance often target existing firms. Examples include tax measures to stimulate firm-level Research & Development and structural reforms to eliminate distortions in labour, financial, and product markets. In a new paper we investigate an entirely different policy lever, one that has so far remained largely unexplored: influencing the types of firms that are being started in the first place. Using a comprehensive new data set on European start-ups, we show how tax policies that shift the composition of new start-up cohorts could deliver meaningful macroeconomic gains.
Remote working soared during the Covid-19 (Covid) pandemic. Over half of British workers worked from home during the initial Covid lockdowns (first panel in Chart 1). And by February this year, nearly a third of workers were still doing so at least some of the time. But will this last? In this blog post, I explore firms’ and workers’ attitudes to remote working, the extent to which these may differ, and factors that might affect negotiations between them on future remote working arrangements.
The Covid pandemic has led to a large enforced shift towards working from home (WFH) as a result of ‘stay-at-home’ policies in many countries. This led to a resurgence in interest in, and new reignited discussion about, the consequences of greater WFH. In this briefing we review the literature on the impact of WFH on productivity. Across a very diverse literature the key lessons are: impacts depend on the nature of tasks, the share of WFH matters, and there is big difference between enforced versus voluntary WFH. And the caveats are important too: cost savings at the firm level don’t automatically translate into economy-wide productivity gains and evidence on long-run effects remains very scarce.
Monetary policy makers need to know whether the economy is operating above or below its supply capacity. If the economy is operating above its supply capacity, inflation is likely to rise, and vice versa. A crucial component of supply capacity is the labour productivity trend but we cannot observe this directly. We have to estimate it. Thankfully, there are ways of splitting observed macroeconomic time series into estimated trend and cyclical components. Using a variety of methods on UK data, I find that UK productivity growth over the period 1991 to 2018 has been structurally, rather than cyclically, weak since the financial crisis. And, UK trend productivity has been strongly correlated with trend productivity in other advanced economies.
Aggregate labour productivity growth has been low in the UK following the global financial crisis in 2008 (Chart 1). The average annual growth rate has been only 0.7% over the period 2008 to 2019, which is around a third of the growth rate seen during the decade preceding the crisis. There are many ways of analysing the reasons for this weakness, but in this blog post, I concentrate on examining the role that the largest firms in the UK have played in the story. Our analysis covering the past three decades from 1990 to 2017 suggests that firm-specific, or idiosyncratic, shocks to the 100 largest firms had a significant effect on aggregate productivity dynamics in the UK.
Firm age is a main determinant of firm growth and survival. For example, older firms are likely to be larger and grow more slowly than younger ones (see Audretsch & Mata, 1995; Coad et al, 2013). They are also more likely to survive (see Audretsch & Mahmood, 1995, Manjón-Antolín & Arauzo-Carod, 2008). This is why, in this blog post, we look at how firms’ lifecycles – firms being born, aging and dying – are linked to how firms grow. The results show that, as they age, firms in the United Kingdom grow mainly by employing more people, rather than by generating more turnover per employee. And while firms are on average less likely to die the older they get, the cohort of firms that were born since the financial crisis are more resilient than older firms.
Firms are increasingly investing in automation, substituting capital for labour, as workers become more scarce and costly. We are seeing multiple examples, from automation in food processing to increasingly-common self-service tills. This push for productivity growth is one of the key themes from our meetings with businesses in the past year, which we think suggests a reversal of a decade-long trend.
Smartphone apps and newsfeeds are designed to constantly grab our attention. And research suggests we’re distracted nearly 50% of the time. Could this be weighing down on productivity? And why is the crisis of attention particularly concerning in the context of the rise of AI and the need, therefore, to cultivate distinctively human qualities?