What caused the LDI crisis?

Gabor Pinter, Emil Siriwardane and Danny Walker

In September 2022 the interest rate on UK gilts rose by over 100 basis points in four days. These unprecedent market movements are generally attributed to two key factors: the 23 September announcement of expansionary fiscal policy – the so-called ‘mini-budget’ – which was then amplified by forced sales by liability-driven investment funds (LDI funds). We estimate that LDI selling accounted for half of the decline in gilt prices during this period, with fiscal policy likely accounting for the other half. Balance sheet segmentation and operational issues slowed capital injections into LDI funds by well-capitalised pension schemes, leading LDI funds to instead sell gilts. Our analysis shows that these frictions were most pronounced for pooled LDI funds. There are further details in an associated working paper.

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Futures under stress: how did gilt futures behave in the LDI crisis?

Joel Mundy and Matt Roberts-Sklar

When markets are volatile, liquidity tends to worsen. This makes it harder to intermediate buyers and sellers. We saw this during the 2022 liability-driven investment (LDI) stress, when the UK government bond (gilt) market exhibited extreme volatility. This illiquidity was also evident in gilt futures, derivatives that support functioning in the cash gilt market. Gilt futures are traded on an electronic orderbook, meaning we can examine liquidity metrics at very high frequency. Looking across a range of liquidity metrics for gilt futures, we find that liquidity was broadly unchanged following the Monetary Policy Committee’s (MPC’s) decision of 22 September 2022. But market functioning deteriorated heavily following the UK Government’s fiscal statement of 23 September and took a long time to recover.

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Leverage finds a way: a comparison of US Treasury basis trading and the LDI event

Adam Brinley Codd, Daniel Krause, Pierre Ortlieb and Alex Briers

We both drive cars, but the US drives on the right while the UK drives on the left. We both walk, but we do so on sidewalks in the US and pavements in the UK. We both have asset managers, who want to take leveraged positions in interest rates. US asset managers had around US$650 billion of long treasury futures in June 2023. UK asset managers, in Autumn 2022, held around £200 billion in leveraged repo. However, the ways in which the financial system found willing lenders for these borrowers, and intermediated the risk through the system of market-based finance, differ.

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Lifting the lid on a liquidity crisis

Lydia Henning, Simon Jurkatis, Manesh Powar and Gian Valentini

Autumn 2022 saw some of the largest intraday moves in gilt yields in history. It was then that jargon normally confined to financial stability papers entered into mainstream commentary – ‘LDI’, ‘doom loop’, ‘deleveraging’. And it was then that the Bank of England engaged in an unprecedented financial stability motivated government bond market intervention. What happened and why has been set out in detail in official Bank communications. This article instead hovers a magnifying glass over transaction-level regulatory data on derivative, repurchase agreements (repo) and bond markets to quantify liability-driven investment (LDI) and pension fund behaviour and enrich our understanding of these exceptional few weeks of stress.

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