James Purchase and Nick Constantine.
In 1995, Fischer Black, an economist whose ground-breaking work in financial theory helped revolutionise options trading, confidently stated that “the nominal short rate cannot be negative.” Twenty years later this assumption looks questionable: one quarter of world GDP now comes from countries with negative central bank policy rates. Practitioners have been forced to update their models accordingly, in many cases introducing greater complexity. But this shift is not just academic. Models allowing for a wider distribution of future rates require market participants to hedge against greater uncertainty. We argue that this hedging contributed to the volatility in global rates in early 2015, but that derivatives can also play an important role in facilitating monetary policy transmission at negative rates.
R. Anton Braun, Lena Boneva & Yuichiro Waki.
Does fiscal policy have large and qualitatively different effects when the nominal interest rate is zero? An emerging consensus in the New Keynesian literature is that supply-side fiscal stimulus is ineffective at the zero lower bound (ZLB) while demand-side fiscal stimulus is a useful tool to escape a liquidity trap. But new evidence provided in our paper suggests that supply-side fiscal policies can play an important role at the ZLB while the effects of demand-side stimulus may be weaker than previously found.
Richard Harrison, Lena Boneva and Matt Waldron.
Following the Great Recession, many central banks cut their policy rates towards their lower bounds and turned to unconventional policy measures in a bid to revive their economies. That was accompanied by an increasing use of `forward guidance’ about the future path of the policy rate. In this post we summarise results from our ongoing research on `Threshold-Based Forward Guidance’, whereby the policymaker links their decision to raise the policy rate from the lower bound to outturns for particular macroeconomic variables. We show that TBFG can improve welfare at the lower bound by increasing expected future inflation and, unlike forward guidance based purely on calendar time, by shrinking the variance of possible outcomes for inflation around the target.