Regulatory independence and financial stability

Rhiannon Sowerbutts

The Bank of England Agenda for Research (BEAR) sets the key areas for new research at the Bank over the coming years. This post is an example of issues considered under the Financial System Theme which focuses on the shifting landscape and new risks confronting financial policymakers.


Institutions matter. And in the world of economics, few institutions are as prized as independent central banks. Monetary policy independence, many argue, allows central banks to look through electoral cycles to prioritise long-run price stability. But what about price stabilityโ€™s younger, less glamorous cousin โ€“ financial stability? In a recent paper, we develop a measure of regulatory and supervisory independence (or the lack of it) and examine what are the implications for financial stability. Our findings underline the critical importance of robust, independent regulatory frameworks to safeguard financial systems and show that just as with monetary policy โ€“ independence matters for regulation and supervision too.

Continue reading “Regulatory independence and financial stability”