Bob Gilhooly, Gene Kindberg-Hanlon and Dan Wales.
The dramatic fall in the price of oil has had a marked effect on headline inflation across the world. In contrast, measures of core inflation (ex. food & energy) have been more stable suggesting, that once the base effects from oil drop out, headline rates of inflation should bounce back. However, while inflation rates around the world will mechanically pick up in the near-term, it is not clear that global labour markets are strong enough to drive inflation fully back to target.
In June last year the price of a barrel of oil peaked at a little over $115, before falling to around $45 by January 2015, one of the largest ever falls without a clear trigger. Of course, this decline should provide a significant boost to many economies: as consumers spend less at the petrol pumps they could opt to spend more on other goods, boosting inflation in the medium-term. But, in the short-term, this decline in the oil price has lowered headline inflation across the world by around 2pp since mid-2014 (Chart 1).
Chart 1: Oil prices vs average CPI and core CPI across the world
Sources: Thomson Reuters DataStream, CEIC and Bank of England calculations.
* Global equates to 70% of world PPP GDP; 20 country sample.
Measures of core inflation that attempt to strip out shocks to energy and food prices have seen much more modest moves. So, while the decline in oil makes judging inflationary pressures much more difficult, this could suggest that underlying inflationary pressures remain strong enough to bring inflation back to target.
But the relative stability of average core inflation across the world may give false comfort. Core inflation had started to slide in many countries before the fall in oil prices. And, although in aggregate global core inflation appears stable, in the post-crisis period the relative strength of core inflation in many emerging markets has offset low core inflation in many advanced economies.
In the past, high commodity price inflation enabled authorities to reach headline inflation targets with relatively modest core inflation. Using the weights of food and energy in the CPI baskets for advanced economy inflation targeters and the average rates of food and energy inflation over the past, we can construct implied targets for core inflation for each country which are consistent with headline inflation at target. Indeed, such an implied measure arguably provides a better benchmark for assessing inflationary pressure, given that central banks will almost always look through volatility in commodity prices. Using this framework, the current rate of core inflation across advanced economies is around 0.4pp below its implied target, and has been so for over two and a half years (Chart 2, blue line).
Chart 2: Implied deviation of advanced economy core inflation from target
Sources: Thomson Reuters DataStream, CEIC and Bank of England calculations.
*AE equates to 35% world PPP GDP; *implied inflation targets assuming food & energy inflation of 3.8% pa, which is equal to the OECD average since 2000; ** assuming food & energy inflation of 2.5% pa.
Much of the surge in commodity prices between 2000 and 2014 was triggered by a step change in emerging market growth. This picked up from an average of 3.7% over 1980-2000 to 6% post 2000. Partly because of this, emerging market economies have accounted for all of the 20 million barrels per day increase in global oil consumption over the past 15 years. But more recently prospects for emerging markets have deteriorated. Several major emerging markets, including Russia and Brazil, have entered deep cyclical recessions and Chinese growth has continued to decelerate. The IMF expects growth in emerging markets to only recover gradually, averaging just 4.5% over the next three years. This could be associated with much lower commodity price growth, and highlights the possibility that the extraordinary commodity price growth which occurred over the past two decades will not be repeated.
Assuming this change in emerging market growth weighs on commodity price growth by around 1pp, we can re-examine just how problematic the current weakness of core inflation could be in returning inflation to target. In that case, the shortfall between the current rate of advanced economy core inflation and that consistent with the headline inflation target increases to around 0.7pp (Chart 2, red line).
To reach global inflation targets, any reduced contribution of commodity prices to headline inflation going forward would require domestic cost pressures to shoulder more of the burden than they did in the pre-crisis period. The labour market may provide an indication of whether the underlying drivers of inflation are sufficiently strong to return inflation back to target after the base effects holding inflation down drop out. Wage growth has been weak both in the UK and abroad, even in countries where slack in the labour market is now thought to be very small. Of course, much of this is likely to reflect (perhaps temporary) damage to productivity growth caused by the financial crisis and, as such, lower average wage increases could be associated with the same degree of inflationary pressure. Indeed, unit labour cost (ULC) growth rates across OECD countries are around 0.5pp lower than their pre-crisis average, and the interquartile range has shifted down, but they are not unprecedentedly low (Chart 3, blue line). But, assuming lower growth in emerging markets weighs on commodity price growth by around 1pp, current advanced economy ULC growth would be around 0.9pp beneath the rate required to hit inflation targets (Chart 3, red line).
Chart 3: Unit Labour Costs (ULCs)
Source: OECD and Bank of England calculations. *Assuming the all of the weakness in commodity prices inflation is offset by higher ULC growth to maintain headline inflation targets.
We are able to explain some of the recent weakness in wages as reflecting the remaining slack in advanced economy labour markets. Simple wage equations attempting to control for the degree of labour market slack and other factors, such as productivity, account for the weakness in wages reasonably well in recent quarters, even if the residuals on these equations have been negative for most G7 economies for around two and a half years (Chart 4). As the remaining slack erodes domestic cost pressures should increase. However, these equations have been estimated over a period when unusually strong commodity price growth supplemented weaker domestic cost pressures to keep inflation at target. Therefore, if lower commodity price growth persists, wage growth may need to strengthen by more than you would otherwise expect for inflation to return to target.
Chart 4: Unexplained component of nominal wage growth in G7 economies
Sources: Thomson Reuters DataStream Eurostat, ONS, OECD, national sources and Bank of England calculations.
Note: Wage equations estimated over 1995-2015 using logged variables as follows:
As the past falls in oil prices drop out of the annual comparison, rates of inflation will mechanically pick up across much of the world. But underlying inflationary pressures in the G7 remain weak, despite many countries having low and falling unemployment rates. While the relationship between the labour market and inflation is hard to pin down, it is difficult to believe that this underlying link is truly broken: we will need to see the labour market heat up further to be confident that inflation across the G7 is really headed back to target.
Bob Gilhooly works in the Bank’s International Surveillance Division, Gene Kindberg-Hanlon works in the Bank’s Global Spillovers & Interconnections Division and Dan Wales works in the Bank’s International Surveillance Division.
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