Dooho Shin, Danae Kyriakopoulou and Josh Perers Cook

Clean power generation, grid investment and growing electricity demand are changing the sources and transmission of energy inflation. In the UK, electricity has become more important in household spending, while gas continues to play an important role in wholesale electricity prices. The Government is also considering how to reduce the influence of gas prices on electricity bills. Building on recent NGFS work on the macroeconomic and monetary-policy implications of the transition, this post examines three channels through which changes in the energy system could affect UK inflation over different horizons: the composition of energy spending; the relationship between gas and wholesale electricity prices; and supply-chain pressures arising from grid investment.
Why this matters for monetary policy makers
Energy system changes and policy are primarily for governments, not central banks. Still, in setting monetary policy, central banks need to assess how energy shocks affect inflation, output and expectations. Historically, central bankers focused on aggregate oil and gas prices, which have primarily driven energy inflation. In a changing energy supply system, policymakers need to also understand electricity markets, grid constraints and supply chains to assess how they impact aggregate prices through consumer bills and input costs.
A 2024 report by the Central Banks and Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) and led by the Bank of England entitled ‘The green transition and the macroeconomy: a monetary policy perspective’ offers a useful starting point. It sets out how climate change mitigation, green investment, and transition uncertainty can affect inflation and output over horizons relevant for monetary policy. Recent speeches in 2025 and 2026 have outlined the ways in which climate change and transition shocks are becoming increasingly material over the monetary-policy horizon. This is part of a broader trend of central banks facing more frequent supply-side shocks, as noted in another recent speech. Heightened geopolitical risk is one driver, with the conflict in the Middle East disrupting fossil fuel supply and leading to a higher and more volatile energy inflation as highlighted recently.
At the same time, structural changes in the energy system impact how energy price shocks are transmitted through the economy. The energy transition is a principal element within governments’ net zero commitments; and the UK has made this a central pillar through the Clean Power Act 2030. A recent speech highlighted that a sufficiently high share of renewables in generation together with storage and flexibility can reduce the sensitivity of electricity prices to fossil fuel prices.
Taken together, these factors suggest that the energy transition should be treated as a structural change not simply in the energy environment but also in the macroeconomic environment, and as such as an increasingly important source of changes that monetary policy makers need to understand better.
Responding to this need, and building on the NGFS work on the macroeconomic and monetary policy impacts of the transition, we have developed a framework for assessing the energy transition’s impact on inflation. The framework highlights three ways in which the transition is changing the sources of energy price shocks and their transmission to the macroeconomy and inflation.
The first key aspect is a gradual change in the composition of energy spending.
Chart 1 shows that the weight of electricity in the UK consumer prices index (CPI) has overtaken that of gas and petrol over the past decade. The 2026 weights show that around 2% of the average UK consumer’s total spending goes to electricity, 1.5% to petrol, and 1% to gas. The CPI weights depend on the relative retail prices of the fuels, as well as how much heating and transport depend on each fuel.
Chart 1: CPI weights of electricity, gas and petrol in the United Kingdom

Sources: Office for National Statistics and Bank calculations.
As electrification accelerates in line with the UK Government’s net zero commitments, electricity prices are expected to matter increasingly for inflation, while the importance of oil and gas prices diminish. These changes could also affect inflation through business costs if UK industries electrify their production processes.
To understand the continuously evolving impacts on inflation, policymakers increasingly need to understand how these weights may change and why. For example, changes in relative retail prices of the fuels (a lower electricity-to-gas price ratio) can impact the pace of electrification (through, for example, encouraging the uptake of heat pumps).
The second is a change in the drivers of the wholesale electricity cost.
The disproportionately large role that fossil fuels play in setting wholesale electricity market prices matters, even as the share of clean power increases. This is because the relationship between generation mix and wholesale price-setting is non-linear. Many electricity markets operate a merit order where the on-demand generator with the highest marginal cost sets the market price. And fossil fuel generation tends to have a higher marginal cost than clean power. This means insofar as there are fossil fuel generators on demand, they could set prices, even if their share of generation is smaller than that of clean power.
Further, the quarterly cap on consumer electricity bills set by Ofgem in Great Britain (GB) is based on futures prices, and longer-term fixed tariffs also draw on futures prices. This means that the gas-electricity link we see in the spot market may not flow to consumer bills. Chart 2 shows that in the GB spot (day-ahead) market, the correlation between gas and electricity prices has fallen rapidly since the 2022 energy crisis (aqua line). In contrast, the correlation in the futures market remains close to 1 (purple line). Looking ahead based on gas and electricity futures contracts out to 2030, the latest market pricing suggests the gas-electricity correlation will gradually fall. But this could change as we roll forward; a year ago the futures markets priced the correlation to fall in 2027 (orange line), while the latest observation suggests little change by then (purple line).
The higher-for-longer gas-electricity correlation in the futures market is likely due to the weather risk renewables face: they have less certainty over future generation than gas generators. For example, year-ahead futures prices must account for uncertainty about future wind conditions. By contrast, spot prices reflect how much wind will be available tomorrow, which is much more certain. More renewables and storage – depending on their mix and scale – may reduce the correlation in the coming years.
Chart 2: Electricity and gas price correlations in spot and futures markets in Great Britain

Sources: Bloomberg and Bank calculations.
Further, two-sided Contracts for Difference (CfDs) can reinforce the gas-electricity decoupling. These are long-term fixed-price contracts for clean power generation used in GB and increasingly abroad. CfDs reduce the pass-through from volatile wholesale prices to generator revenues and, indirectly, to the wholesale cost component of consumer bills. They do so by paying back consumers when wholesale market prices rise above their fixed prices and billing consumers an additional amount when market prices are lower.
Chart 3 shows that as CfD generation grew, so did its impact on consumer electricity bills (‘CfD levy’). In normal times, consumers paid an additional levy on top of market prices. During the 2022–23 energy crisis, wholesale market prices were higher than CfD fixed prices, and as a result CfD generators paid consumers the difference, reducing the impact of the gas-price shock on inflation through electricity bills.
Chart 3: Contracts for difference annual generation and average levies in Great Britain

Sources: Low Carbon Contracts Company, Office of Gas and Electricity Markets, and Bank calculations.
As a greater share of generation moves onto fixed-price arrangements, gas-price spikes should have a smaller direct effect on electricity bills than in a system where more clean power remains exposed to market prices.
Finally, the third way in which the energy transition is affecting inflation is through changes in the global supply chain for grid buildout.
In many countries, network charges are already a major component of retail electricity prices. As investment in grids scales up, pressures in the global supply chain for the grid, including critical minerals, transformers, and cables could become a more persistent source of inflation. And these pressures could have a broad-based impact on inflation, as the inputs for the grid are also used in other areas such as data centres.
The IEA’s Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025 highlights rising concentration in refining and growing use of export restrictions across energy-related minerals. The same concern extends to grid components, specialised manufacturing capacity and skilled installation. Even without a major geopolitical shock, bottlenecks in these areas can raise costs and delay deployment, putting price pressure on energy bills and a broader set of price items.
Conclusion
The energy transition is not only changing the energy system; it is changing the drivers and transmission of energy inflation. This is not entirely separate from other non-energy determinants of inflation that policymakers are typically concerned about. Monetary policy makers will therefore want to pay closer attention to electricity prices going forward, how the wholesale cost of electricity is shaped, and the supply chains for the grid buildout. Understanding inflation in the transition will increasingly require knowledge of electrification, clean power and critical inputs, to assess the changing composition of energy spending, gas-electricity price link, and impact on the supply chain.
Dooho Shin and Danae Kyriakopoulou work in the Bank’s Climate, Sustainability and Communities Division, and Josh Perers Cook works in the Bank’s Content and Strategy Division.
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